Mathew King is a Reactor Operator at the Nuclear Radiation Center at Washington State University. When Mat isn’t safely operating a nuclear reactor, he can be found commenting and contributing here at Nuclear Fissionary. Today he will help us understand the complex array of factors that contributed to the worst nuclear disaster in human history, Chernobyl.
In the last fifty years, most of the industrial world has become increasingly reliant on safe, renewable, clean, and nearly limitless energy. I’m not talking about unreliable wind turbines, or the chemical filled solar panels touted by the ‘green’ movement. Rather it’s nuclear power that fits these descriptors as well as any, and yet it is one of the most controversial forms of energy production in the world.
The pro-nuke side usually comes to the table armed with facts, statistics, and physics, while the anti-nukes have one big poster boy for their cause: Chernobyl.
Chernobyl was an RBMK-1000 Soviet power/weapons production/testing reactor near Pripyat, Ukraine which destroyed itself in the worst nuclear power disaster in history. Some basic nuclear theory is required to fully understand the event, so feel free to click on the links to learn more about the nuclear theory.
The Fatal Flaws that led to the Chernobyl Disaster
Chernobyl’s Graphite Moderated Reactor
Most reactors use either water or graphite to moderate the reactor core. Chernobyl was a graphite moderated reactor that used water only for cooling. United States (and now Russian) reactors are all required by law to be slightly under-moderated. This way, if a catastrophic event occurred where all coolant was lost the reactor would shut itself down (i.e. Three Mile Island).
Prompt-Temperature Coefficient
Another contributor to this event was an effect called a prompt-temperature coefficient (which can be either positive or negative). In short, a positive temperature coefficient means that when a reactor gets hotter, it gets more reactive and power increases. A negative temperature coefficient means exactly the opposite. The hotter the core gets the more it wants to shut itself down. All reactors are now required by law to have an engineered negative temperature coefficient. Unfortunately, Chernobyl’s was positive.
Control Rods used in RBMK Reactors
The design of the RBMK style reactors also had a large flaw in the Control Rods. The control rods contain a poison (Boron or Hafnium) that are inserted into channels between the graphite moderator and Uranium fuel to absorb neutrons and slow down the reaction. The problem was that the tips of these control rods was not Boron poison, but graphite, a moderator. This means that control rods briefly increased power before bringing power down when they were inserted.
The Unit 4 Test that sealed Chernobyl’s Fate
On April 25th of 1986, all of these design flaws came to a head when there was a scheduled test on reactor 4 of the Chernobyl complex. They were trying to find out how long they could cool the reactor if they shut down using only the residual steam and coasting turbines for power to run the coolant pumps. United States law does not allow such experiments at nuclear power plants.
In order to run this test they had to bypass several automated safety systems which was in violation of their own protocols. This was strongly objected to by the reactor operators, but unfortunately, an engineer was in charge. An American reactor operator or engineer could be sent to jail for such behavior.
This experiment had already been done several times unsuccessfully, and the only difference this time was a delay and the disabled safety systems. The reactor was run down to a low power and held there for the experiment. But shortly after that, a call came through ordering the plant to delay the experiment for several hours because of a sudden increase in power demand on the grid. The reactor was run at this low power for nearly twelve hours.
At low power, with fewer neutrons in the core, Xenon-135 built in at an accelerated rate, and the operators noticed that power was dropping further. They began withdrawing motorized control rods further and further in an attempt to stay at power, until the control elements were in their fully withdrawn position.
To make matters worse, once the experiment began, they turned on some extra cooling pumps, making the core cooler causing power to drop even more. At that point they had a reactor held at low power by cold water and burnable poison, with all of its control elements fully removed, and they were about to turn off the cooling pumps.
Compare this scenario to a game tug of war. You are pulling as hard as you possibly can but going nowhere. Then suddenly the other team lets go and you are sent flying out of control.
When they shut off the steam supply to the turbines, the flow of water slowed within the core increasing heat and raising reactor power because of their positive temperature coefficient. The reactor power increased so rapidly that someone hit the big-red button called the SCRAM(emergency shutdown).
Now, the graphite tips of the control rods (a moderator) quickly drove into the reactor, the moderator section filled the space between the fuel and further increased the reaction. This sudden increase in power and heat, led to another increase in power and heat and there was a runaway chain reaction known as a feedback loop.
The heat and power increased so rapidly that there was a steam explosion that blew the 1,200 ton reactor head off the core and through the thin roof of the building. Without the reinforced concrete and steel containment structures of American reactors, the highly radioactive molten fuel and burning graphite was ejected into the atmosphere.
The Aftermath
The rest is just a mess, firefighters were sent in unaware of the deadly radiation levels, and the Soviet government refused to even acknowledge the incident for several days. This caused the death of all firefighters and workers sent in to put out the fires and clean up the mess. It also resulted in an impossible to count number of Thyroid Cancer cases that often result in death. The entire nearby pine forest died from radiation poising within a few weeks.
It was the inherent design flaws and human error combined with a culture at the plant that placed results ahead of safety that caused this disaster. If you remove any one of those three elements from the equation, this could not happen. The Three Mile Island scenario was similar to Chernobyl in that several problems occurred simultaneously and destroyed the reactor. However, the designed fail safes and containment structure of the Reactor functioned as designed and no one was hurt, and no one received an excessive dose of radiation.
Chernobyl was a hard lesson learned by the Soviets and indeed to the entire global nuclear industry. The US has also taken some cues from the incident and placed additional limits on safety culture and operator training. Now with more need for reliable energy than ever, I hope my future kids grow up in a nuclear world.
Image Credit
Chernobyl photo courtesy of Flickr user Kamil Porembinski published under the CC license.






27 Comments
Nice, short, relatively brief (i.e. readable) description of the Chernobyl accident. I wasn’t aware of the graphite-tipped control rods used a Chernobyl.
Just on the thyroid cancers, thyroid cancer is quite treatable. If the health care system is and was functioning properly most of the thyroid cancers should have been identified and treated, i.e. high incidents of thyroid but relativelt few deaths.
I never really considered that as a contributor, but you’re right. Another was emergency plan, which of course the Russians didn’t have one. Many hours after the event people in Pripyat were just going about there business. How much exposure could have been prevented if the plant had an emergency plan?
My impression was that under the Russian system, the person with most authority at Chernobyl was not the one who knew how to run the plant. The guy who knew was #2 in command. This way, touring bigwigs could ask to see the #1 man in charge and they’d be able to see him, making them feel important. The #1 guy could spend his time socializing or whatever, and the #2 guy, who actually was running the plant, could make sure the plant was in great shape. But this #1 guy was more moronic than usual: he decides he knows enough to do this experiment even though #2 warned him against it, while #2 is at home, and he blows up the plant. Correct?
I’m not sure about who was where at the time of the event, but I do know that the test engineer was in charge of the control room instead of a licensed operator. Also the culture in the Russian nuclear industry was that off domineering executives focused on results ahead of safety and subordinates were not taught to question authority. US nuclear plants have strict laws about a safety conscious work environment where employees are not intimidated into not raising safety concerns. The slightest mention of such behaviors is grounds for investigation by the NRC.
Fissionaries might like to read the real story on Chernobyl and radiation,
by Zbigniew Jaworowski, who was in charge of radiation protection in Poland
at the time of the accident. “The Real Chernobyl Folly”
http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/2006_articles/spring%202006/Chernobyl_Folly.pdf
Hi there. Quick introduction – I’m a new nuclear engineer at BVPS in PA, and I recently had a training class that covered Chernobyl for a few hours. 99% of what was said here matches up exactly with what I learned, but there was one thing that I had a slightly different impression about. You said:
“The design of the RBMK style reactors also had a large flaw in the Control Rods. The control rods contain a poison (Boron or Hafnium) that are inserted into channels between the graphite moderator and Uranium fuel to absorb neutrons and slow down the reaction. The problem was that the tips of these control rods was not Boron poison, but graphite, a moderator. This means that control rods briefly increased power before bringing power down when they were inserted.”
As I understood it in class, while they were designed as you describe them, the normal use of the control rods was to never fully remove them from the core. It wasn’t so much a design issue, as it was (similar to other cases with Chernobyl) the issue of an untrained engineer controlling a very complex system of which he had no knowledge.
Minor nitpick and all, but I was just wondering if I misinterpreted it earlier. Anyway, I look forward to reading more from this site. Keep up the good work, and thank you very much!
Hey Garrett. Nice to have a PWR guy in here.
I’m not sure what the design limits were or what the exact rod position was, but I do know they were pulling rods when they shouldn’t have. They were trying to maintain the low power point they needed for the test but were battling a massive Xenon transient caused by a delay in the power reduction. The load dispatcher called the plant and told them to maintian the medium power they were at during the decension. It is illegal for a dispatcher to give orders to the control room in a US plant. With the Xenon building in, power started to drop further and the engineer directing the test made the operators pull rods to stay at power. Pulling rods during a Xenon spike is an incredibly reckless operational practice and the operators should have stood up to the engineer, but the culture at the plant was that of obedience and silence, so they went ahead anyway.
What is commonly called a graphite “tip” on the RBMK control rods is actually a rod of graphite, which is called a “follower” or a “rider” and is over four meters long. It takes the place of the control rod when it is withdrawn.
The control rod channels in this reactor were filled with water, so when the control rod was withdrawn, water would take its place, if the follower did not exist. Water absorbs neutrons, so the graphite follower was used to displace this water, which improves the neutron economy.
When the control rods were reinserted, after being completely pulled out of the core, there was a brief increase in power, but only at the very bottom of the core, where the water below the follower was replaced with graphite as the rod fell. Both water and graphite are moderators, but water is a more efficient moderator than graphite. Thus, it wasn’t an introduction of extra moderation that caused the problem, but the displacement of the water, which absorbs neutrons, that lead to the increase in reactivity. Unfortunately, this was sufficient to drive the power excursion further, leading to the accident.
Jack – good summary. Like T-squared, however, I have to ask you to correct what you wrote about the thyroid cancers. They are generally treatable. The studies that I have read indicate that the death toll from that cause was something in the single digits – 3 is the number I recall.
The total death toll according to the UNSCEAR report is just 56. Tragic, but certainly not the worst industrial accident of its decade and far from the worst in industrial history.
Also, the forest has recovered – I highly recommend reading a book by Mary Mycio titled “Wormwood Forest”>
Rod – As I recall, the number of recorded deaths from thyroid cancer was 10 or less. Fortunately, thyroid cancer is a very treatable condition.
The number of cases of thyroid cancer in the region went up after the accident, and no doubt, much of it was due to the iodine-131 that was released during the accident. However, we’ll probably never know how much of this increase in thyroid cancers was due to the accident and how much was due to the discovery of normally occurring occult cancers that would have never been detected if the increased screening of the population after the accident had not been implemented.
I doubt he intended to make the number sound higher than it was, just the fact that it is impossible to count, certainly not the thousands that Greenpeace would have you believe. The best anyone can do is hypothesis as too how many thyroid cancer cases were caused by Chernobyl and not the over 2,000 nuclear weapons detonated in the atmosphere during the cold war, or just simple genetics.
Also a good point about the forest growing back. The environment recovered much faster than expected.
Oops – I just realized that the post author was Mathew King, not Jack. Sorry.
I’ve looked around for the book I read on Chernobyl back when it happened but I’m not sure what the title was. The idea that the director of the facility ignorantly commanded the more knowledgeable reactor operators to blow the facility up, and they, more or less horrified, followed his orders, is in older books. For instance, from a review on Amazon of a book called “Chernobyl: The Forbidden Truth”, by Alla Yaroshinskaya:
“An individual who had the appropriate civil service rank was appointed director of the facility, even though he had no understanding of a nuclear reactor, and had never worked at a nuclear power plant. (The bulk of his experience was in large transformers for long-distance power lines.) He simply marched in and demonstrated his authority by giving orders to the reactor operators until he had created a meltdown. By the time that the district manager arrived – horrified – and took over, the damage was done.”
Just wanted to say I enjoyed this article immensely and it helped me a lot in the writing of an engineering paper for my second-year Mech.Eng. class.
The supplementary links helped the explanations thoroughly, as well.
Thanks!
Best of luck with the paper Nils.
Would Chernobyl have exploded into the air if it had had a containment built to U.S. standards and everything else was the same?
No. It would have exploded into a thick, reinforced-concrete containment building.
Just a clarification, would a containment built to U.S. standards fail if a chernobyl style reactor failed inside it, in the way the Russion reactor failed? I think you mean “no”, but I’m not sure.
A LWR Containment structure would withstand a Chernobyl style explosion, yes. At the very least, any hypothetical breaches would be small compared to the tin roof of the RBMK reactors.
I bet you feel stupid now.
Great comment Kana!
Chernobyl plant crew obviously made many mistakes which led to the biggest nuclear disaster ever. However, I am kind of sick and tired of overstatements as to how US laws and security policies are so much better and tighter than those elsewhere and how similar disaster could never happen in US. Look what just happened in Japan. If they don’t have the highest security standards, subordination and highly educated personnel, I don’t know who has. Yet, they had three reactor buildings blown into pieces. Nobody wants accidents but they can happen anywhere. Keep that in mind before you start bragging and criticizing and learn to be sympathetic.
The Three Mile Incident cannot be compared to Chernobyl. I appreciate your description and from the technical point of view is quite accurate (I am myself engineer in a Nuclear Power Plant in Spain) but I find quite arrogant all your remarks that lead to think that something like that could NEVER happen in America. Of course we all hope it doesn’t, but the Fukushima plant had evenmore fail-safes than most american plants.
Que viva España!
Thank you for this article; it’s very clear. A reference in an excellent Wikipedia entry let me here. I’m an electronics engineer, so i know little about nuclear power, but i love to know how things work..
I also read the article on Xenon-135 poisoning and it’s effects. Also very clear.
But now to the Chernobyl situation just before things went wrong: The reactor had produced excessive amounts of Xenon-135 due to the prolonged low-power setting, as i understand.
What would be the operating procedure to handle an excess buildup of Xe-135? Would it not be to shut down and wait until the excess Xe-135 had decayed?
The Wikipedia entry states that Leonid Toptunov; an operator with only three months experience had ‘mistakenly’ lowered the control rods too far; reducing power to a near shutdown. Subsequently the rods were withdrawn fully to up the power again.
Would it be possible Toptunov just followed textbook rules? Shutdown and let the Xe-135 poisoning subside by natural decay; thus to avoid runaway conditions?
And then he was could have been overruled?
With best regards,
Bas, The Netherlands
nice …vry useful…bt still it isnt up 2 date//…like the 2011 disaster…i nvr undrstud dat if chernobyl is near ukraine den how did it effect japan…presently….???….
mehak, the radio active particles are so light that the can be carried away by winds. when the particles were released, they mixed withn the clouds above chernobyl and the clouds got carried away by winds and started to spread. and thus, it reached japan.
the nuclear wepons maker’s were told [no]. not to use the RBMK reactor ,the first of march 1996. for the energy the RBMK 1000 energy burst could not be contaned.
the US vetran adminastion super seeded vaughn nebeker athority. 600,000 too 1 000,000 people died.,
5 Trackbacks
[...] Chernobyl, a Russian RBMK reactor, was a graphite-moderated plant. Water acts as a coolant in the RBMK but the graphite acts as the moderator. However, as voids form in an RBMK, power increases because the graphite still moderates the neutrons and now more neutrons reach the moderator because there is no water to absorb them. Thus, as the temperature rises in an RBMK, power rises, causing temperature to rise further, and so on. [...]
[...] so much find peace in their life. A recent article about how Chernobyl came to be from 3/10/10. what happened at chernobyl/ A series of photographs of the affected children with commentry by the photographer who seen the [...]
[...] compared against the so-called “dangerous” nuclear power, will kill more people than Chernobyl every [...]
[...] the Chernobyl Disaster pales in comparison to the 2010 Fossil Fuel Meltdown. In 2005, the World Health Organization [...]
[...] reactor has ever resulted in a human death. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the Chernobyl accident resulted in a total of 56 deaths, mostly among those sent to put out the fire at the plant. The [...]